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Abstract 
 In this study, we extended Acemoglu et al. (2014) in the following two ways. 
First, we used a constant elasticity of substitution human capital production function to 
show that in the short run, Internet technologies such as online education are likely to be 
advantageous for middle-income countries. Second, to examine whether one country 
voluntarily supplies online education to other countries, we changed the static model to a 
dynamic model. We found that despite it being a public good, developed countries 
voluntarily supply online education to developing countries. This is because when online 
education is provided, the level of human capital is higher in both transitional dynamics 
and the steady state than otherwise. 
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1. Introduction 
With the ongoing spread and advancement of the Internet, the characteristics of 
globalization are changing. Baldwin (2016) unraveled the history of globalization by 
focusing on the changing costs of three factors: goods, ideas, and people. The advent of 
railroads and steamships in the 19th century led to lower transportation costs, which in 
turn stimulated trade and the concentration of industry in a few countries. The spread of 
the Internet in the 1990s made it easier to manage production processes and operations. 
The formation of international value chains led to the rise of emerging economies. 
Baldwin predicted that the advent of face-to-face technologies and remote technologies, 
which substantially lower the cost of moving people, will further narrow the income gap 
between countries. 
In this study, we examined online education to consider the impact of decreasing 
face-to-face costs on the inequality between developed and developing countries, with 
the aim of answering the following questions. First, which countries experience the 
greatest benefits from online education? Second, what is the impact of online education 
on long-term human capital accumulation? Third, is online education voluntarily 
provided by developed countries to developing countries? 
Our approach involved extending Acemoglu et al. (2014) in the following two 
ways. First, we changed the human capital production function from a Cobb–Douglas 
function to a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function. Second, we extended their 
model to a long-term model, assuming that teachers’ human capital is determined by 
students’ human capital after they are educated. 
The results revealed the following three findings. First, by extending the human 
capital production function proposed by Acemoglu et al. (2014), we developed a model 
in which middle-income countries experience the greatest short-term growth in human 
capital as a result of the adoption of online education. This is because if the quality of 
teachers in developing countries is low, the benefits of local teachers specializing in 
online lectures (benefits of specialization) decrease, and if it is high, the benefits of 
attending lectures presented by the world’s top teachers (benefits of superstar teacher) 
decrease. 
Second, our long-term dynamics showed that developing countries always catch 
up with developed countries when online education is available, after which developed 
and developing countries alternate as leaders. This is because developing countries grow 
more rapidly than developed countries in terms of human capital and eventually catch up, 
as in addition to education by quality teachers in developed countries, the educational 
resources of their own teachers are reallocated to complementary educational activities. 
Leapfrogging occurs when the gap in human capital between leader and follower 
countries is sufficiently small. Because of the small human capital gap between the new 
leader and the new follower countries, the leader and follower countries will continue to 
be replaced. 
Third, although online education is a public good, a leader country will 
voluntarily provide online education to a follower country. This is because long-term 
human capital increases through supplying online education because the leader country 
receives the benefits of higher-quality education and specialization when it is overtaken 
by the follower country. 
Broadly speaking, our study is related to two bodies of literature: that on online 
education and that on cross-country inequality. Particularly, our study is closely related 
to those of Acemoglu et al. (2014) and Li et al. (2016). Acemoglu et al. (2014) presented 
the first quantitative model of the international effects of online education by comparing 
the pre-Internet regime (without online education) with the post-Internet regime (with 
online education). They identified two effects on students’ human capital: a 
“technological windfall,” that is, an increase in students’ human capital resulting from 
access to lectures by world-leading teachers and specialization in the supply of hands-on 
instruction by local faculty, and a “democratizing effect,” which narrows the cross-
country human capital gap as a result of greater technological windfalls in countries with 
lower levels of human capital. We showed that online education is a technological change 
that is more likely to benefit middle-income countries than to produce a democratizing 
effect. 
Li et al. (2016), noting that free riding is a dominant strategy in the supply of 
public goods, modified the model presented by Acemoglu et al. (2014) to a trade model 
for two types of educational goods and argued that establishing online educational clubs 
is effective in preventing free riding. By extending the model of Acemoglu et al. (2014) 
to include long-term dynamics, we show that free riding is not the dominant strategy 
despite online education being an international public good. 
There have also been numerous theoretical and empirical studies on the impact 
of online education on human capital, although their conclusions have been mixed. Posner 
(2012) pointed out that one benefit of online education is that it allows students to either 
rewind or fast-forward their learning, while Perri (2016) based his model on the 
assumption that the benefits are greater for lower-ability students. Studies that have 
empirically examined the effect of the introduction of online education on the academic 
achievement gap include those of Coates et al. (2004), Banerjee and Dufflo (2014), and 
Cacault et al. (2019). For example, Cacault et al. (2019), using a utility function that 
included academic performance and the cost of attending school, found that online 
education improved the grades of high-performing students while lowering those of low-
performing students. We use the human capital production function to explain why the 
benefits of online education are greater for students with lower initial ability, an 
assumption made by Perri (2016). 
Studies on cross-country inequality include those on the human capital Kuznets 
curve, leapfrogging, and the impact of globalization and the Internet. The human capital 
Kuznets curve, in which human capital inequality increases in the early stages of 
economic development and decreases in the later stages of development, was found in 
empirical studies including those by De Gregorio and Lee (2002), Castello and Domenech 
(2002), and Lim and Tang (2008). Studies presenting a theoretical explanation of the 
mechanism include those of Glomm and Ravikumar (1998) and Matsuo and Tomoda 
(2012). Gromm and Ravikumar (1998) showed that increasing short-term returns to scale 
is a necessary condition for obtaining Kuznets’ inverted U-shaped curve. Matsuo and 
Tomoda (2012) introduced the concept of the subsistence consumption level and 
explained that the human capital gap widens in the early stages of development because 
only rich households can invest in education, whereas once economic development is 
sufficiently advanced, the human capital gap shrinks because the return on human capital 
investment declines. While Acemoglu et al (2014) present a model in which countries 
with lower teacher quality benefit more from online education, we present a model that 
is consistent with the human capital Kuznets curve. 
Acemoglu et al. (2014) suggested that online education can contribute to 
narrowing the human capital gap between developed and developing countries, and that 
in some cases, developing countries may even eventually exceed the human capital of 
developed countries. We extended the model of Acemoglu et al. (2014) to include the 
long-term impact of globalization and the Internet on cross-country inequality. Baldwin 
(2016) explained why the gap between developed and developing countries widened prior 
to the 1990s as a result of globalization but then narrowed from the 1990s onwards by 
focusing on the cost of moving ideas. He also pointed out that service workers in 
developed countries might compete with service workers in developing countries in the 
future because online technology advances will lower the cost of face-to-face 
communication. Our long-term model supports this prediction. Our study is also related 
to the literature on leapfrogging, when developing countries surpass developed countries, 
such as the study by Brezis, Krugman, and Tsiddon (1993). It has been shown that a 
country that is overtaken in terms of technology can re-overtake the country that overtook 
it, and we explain this mechanism in terms of human capital. In contrast, our dynamics 
of the human capital gap between the two countries is a limit cycle. In our model, the 
country that is overtaken will re-overtake the country that has overtaken it, but this is not 
a probabilistic phenomenon. 
Our model is similar to that of Tamura (1991), where per capita income 
converges as a result of the spillover effect of human capital. However, Tamura (1991) 
treats how spillover occurs as a given, whereas in our model, the spillover mechanism 
itself is determined endogenously. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the short-
term model, Section 3 presents the long-term model, and Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Short-term Economy 
Following Acemoglu et al. (2014) and Cacault et al. (2019), we consider two 
human capital regimes, the pre- and post-Internet regimes, to enable us to compare the 
case where online education is available with that when it is not available. 
There are two asymmetric countries, and each island 𝑗 (𝑗 = 1, 2) is inhabited 
by a continuum 1  of students and a continuum 1  of teachers. A student’s post-
schooling human capital, a student’s pre-schooling human capital, and the quality of 
teachers in island 𝑗 are denoted by 𝑦! , 𝑒! , and ℎ! , respectively. The teachers’ time 
endowment is normalized to 1 . Because developed countries tend to have more 
developed preschool education than developing countries and the quality of teachers is 
higher, we also assume that 𝑒" ≥ 𝑒#, ℎ" ≥ ℎ#, and ℎ! ≥ 𝑒!. 
Let 𝑖 ∈ [0,1] be the index of education. The amount of educational service 
available to students on island 𝑗, 𝑥!(𝑖), is equal to the composite educational goods 
supplied on island 𝑗, 𝑋!, and is expressed as follows: 
ln𝑋! = 5 ln𝑥!(𝑖)𝑑𝑖"
$
. (1) 






where 𝐻!(𝑖) is the supply of education on island 𝑗 indexed by 𝑖. Now, we consider two 
types of education. Following Acemoglu et al. (2014), “lecture” represents the education 
services supplied by a superstar teacher on island 1 via web-based technologies and 
broadcast to both island 1 and island 2, and thus there is no limit on the number of 
students who are able to “attend.” The remaining education services are “hands-on 
instruction” provided by local teachers, that is, teachers on island 𝑗 provide hands-on 
instruction to the students on island 𝑗. Students receive lectures representing education 
services indexed by 0 ≤ 𝛽 < 1  and hands-on instruction indexed by 1 − 𝛽 . In the 
following explanation, we use variables with a prime (e.g., 𝑦!%) to denote pre-Internet 
values. 
We assume that the total supply of effective education services can be assigned 
to various educational tasks in any way. We also assume that education services are 
competitively priced, and that teachers choose to allocate their time and skills to these 
services based on market prices. This allocation can be alternatively calculated as the 
solution to the maximization problem of post-schooling human capital. Thus, 𝑋!%, 𝑋", 
and 𝑋# are given by equations (3), (4), and (5), respectively, as follows: 
𝑋!% = ℎ"; (3) 
𝑋" = ℎ"; (4) 
𝑋# = ℎ"& > ℎ#1 − 𝛽?
"'& . (5) 
Equation (5) suggests that for island 2, the total supply of effective education 
services increases because of both lectures by the world’s top teachers (benefits of 
superstar teacher) and local teachers’ specialization in supplementing the online lectures 
(benefits of specialization). 
Instead of the Cobb–Douglas human capital production function proposed by 
Acemoglu et al. (2014), we use post-schooling human capital, 𝑦!, which is given by the 
CES human capital production function as follows: 
𝑦! = [(1 − 𝛼)𝑒!( + 𝛼𝑋!(]"( , (6) 
where 𝛼 ∈ [0, 1] and 𝜎 ∈ [0, 1]. From (3), (4), (5), and (6), 𝑦!%, 𝑦", and 𝑦# are given 
by equations (7), (8), and (9), respectively, as follows: 
𝑦!% = [(1 − 𝛼)𝑒!( + 𝛼ℎ!(]"(; (7) 
𝑦" = [(1 − 𝛼)𝑒"( + 𝛼ℎ"(]"(; (8) 
𝑦# = C(1 − 𝛼)𝑒#( + 𝛼ℎ"&( > ℎ#1 − 𝛽?
("'&)(D
"
( . (9) 
 
PROPOSITION 1: (Benefits of Online Education for Developing Countries) Countries 
with lower preschool human capital benefit more from the introduction of online 
education. An inverse U-shaped relationship is found between the quality of teachers in 
developing countries and the benefits of online education. The more educational goods 
that are supplied online, the greater the growth in human capital. 
 
PROOF: The benefit of the introduction of online education, expressed as 𝑦# 𝑦#%⁄ , 
satisfies equation (10) as follows: 
F𝑦#𝑦#%G
( − 1 = 𝛼𝛾
( I𝛾'&( > 11 − 𝛽?
("'&)( − 1J
(1 − 𝛼)𝛿( + 𝛼𝛾( , (10) 
where ℎ# ≡ 𝛾ℎ" and 𝑒# ≡ 𝛿ℎ". Since 0 ≤ 𝛾 ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ 𝛿 ≤ 1 holds, the left-hand 
side of equation (10) decreases with 𝛿 and increases with 𝛽. Partial differentiation of 
equation (10) with respect to 𝛿 yields: 
𝜕𝜕𝛾 IF𝑦#𝑦#%G
( − 1J ⋛ 0	𝑖𝑓	𝛾 ⋚ (1 − 𝛽)"+"'(&( . ∎ (11) 
 
 Equation (11) can be intuitively explained as follows. The lower the quality of 
teachers, the smaller the benefit from specialization, and thus up to a certain point, the 
benefit of online education increases as the quality of teachers increases. However, 
beyond that point, the decrease in benefit of superstar exceeds the increase in the benefit 
of specialization, and thus it becomes smaller. The results for 𝛽 also suggest that the 
human capital of students in developing countries will rise by providing more classes 
online. 
 In summary, it is suggested that the introduction of online education is most 
beneficial for middle-income countries. The introduction of online education in the least-
developed countries (LDCs) is very costly because the Internet is not widely available, 
which means that 𝛽 is small in these countries. The quality of teachers, 𝛾, is also low 
in the LDCs. Thus, if the cost of adopting online education is high, the LDCs may not 
adopt it. 
 
3. Long-term Economy 
In this section, we examine the long-term economy in an effort to determine 
whether there is an incentive for one country to voluntarily supply online education to 
another country. The condition to do so is, after a certain period, the human capital of 
developed countries in the post-Internet regime is higher than that in the pre-Internet 
regime. 
Consider an economy in which there are individuals who live for two periods, 
receiving schooling in the first period and working as teachers in the second period. In 
each period 𝑡, there is a teacher and a student on island 𝑗. In the following analysis,	𝑒! 
does not affect the results, and thus we set 𝜎 → 0 and 𝑒! = 1. We also assume that 𝑦!,$ 
and ℎ!,$ are given. To turn a static model into a dynamic model, we assume that the 
quality of teachers in period 𝑡 + 1 is determined by the post-school human capital 𝑦!,- 
of students in period 𝑡. This can be expressed as follows:  
ℎ!,-+" = 𝑓U𝑦!,-V = 𝜃𝑦!,- , 𝜃 ∈ (0, 1). (12) 
First, let us examine the steady-state human capital of developed and developing 
countries in the pre-Internet regime. To account for the deviation between the period 
when the student receives their education and the post-school period, equation (3) can be 
rewritten as: 
𝑦!,-% = (ℎ!,-% ). = 𝜃.𝑦!,-% . . (13) 
If we define 𝑧!,- ≡ ln𝑦!,-, 𝑧!,-+"%  can be written as: 
𝑧!,-+"% = 𝛼𝑧!,-% + 𝛼ln𝜃. (14) 
 
LEMMA 1: (Pre-Internet Steady State) Under the steady state, the levels of human capital 
of island 1 and island 2 are equal. 
 
PROOF: If we define the steady-state human capital 𝑧!%∗  such that it satisfies 𝑧!%∗ =
𝑧!,-+"% = 𝑧!,-% , 𝑧!∗ is given by: 
𝑧!%∗ = 𝛼1 − 𝛼 ln𝜃. (15) 
Because 𝑧!%∗ is determined independently of 𝑦!,$ and ℎ!,$, 𝑧"∗ = 𝑧#∗ is satisfied.∎ 
 
3.1. Catch-up 
 In the post-Internet regime, there are two possible dynamics: catch-up and 
leapfrogging. Catch-up occurs when 𝑧",- > 𝑧#,- and 𝑧",-+" > 𝑧#,-+" or 𝑧",- < 𝑧#,- and 
𝑧",-+" < 𝑧#,-+" are satisfied, while leapfrogging occurs when 𝑧",- > 𝑧#,- and 𝑧",-+" <
𝑧#,-+"  or 𝑧",-+" < 𝑧#,-+"  and 𝑧",-+" > 𝑧#,-+" . 𝑧",-+"  and 𝑧#,-+"  can be expressed as 
follows: 
𝑧",-+" = 𝛼𝑧",- + 𝛼ln𝜃, (16) 
𝑧#,-+" = 𝛼𝛽𝑧",- + 𝛼(1 − 𝛽)𝑧#,- + 𝛼ln𝜃 − 𝛼(1 − 𝛽)ln(1 − 𝛽). (17) 
 Let period 𝑠  be the smallest 𝑡  such that 𝑧",- > 𝑧#,-  and 𝑧",-+" < 𝑧#,-+"  is 
satisfied. The human capital of island 1  and island 2  is determined by catch-up 
dynamics until period 𝑠. Defining 𝑎- ≡ 𝑧",- − 𝑧#,-, the gap in human capital between 
island 1 and island 2 is expressed as: 
𝑎- = I𝑎$ − 𝛼(1 − 𝛽)1 − 𝛼(1 − 𝛽) ln(1 − 𝛽)J 𝛼-(1 − 𝛽)- + 𝛼(1 − 𝛽)1 − 𝛼(1 − 𝛽) ln(1 − 𝛽),
𝑡 ≤ 𝑠. 
(18) 
 
PROPOSITION 2: (The Transition from Catch-up to Leapfrogging) Leapfrogging occurs 
at least once in the post-Internet regime. 
 
PROOF: Assuming that leapfrogging does not occur, 𝑎- > 0 in all periods, and 0 <
𝛼-(1 − 𝛽)- ≤ 1  decreases monotonically as 𝑡  increases. When 𝑡 = 0 , 𝑎- > 0 , and 
when 𝑡 → ∞, 𝑎- < 0. This is a contradiction.∎ 
 
3.2. Leapfrogging 
 The above discussion shows that the dynamics before period 𝑠 is determined 
by catch-up behavior. We now discuss the dynamics after period 𝑠 + 1. When island 1 
is a follower and island 2 is a leader in period 𝑡, the human capital of island 1 and 
island 2 in period 𝑡 + 1 is represented by equations (19) and (20), respectively, as 
follows: 
𝑧",-+" = 𝛼(1 − 𝛽)𝑧",- + 𝛼𝛽𝑧#,- + 𝛼ln𝜃 − 𝛼(1 − 𝛽)ln(1 − 𝛽), (19) 
𝑧#,-+" = 𝛼𝑧#,- + 𝛼ln𝜃. (20) 
 
PROPOSITION 3: (Change in Leadership) Island 1  and island 2  alternate as the 
leader after period 𝑠 + 1. 
 
PROOF: We use mathematical induction to prove Proposition 3. Let 𝑘 be a non-negative 
integer. We only have to show that island 1 is the leader when 𝑡 = 𝑠 + 2𝑘, that is, 
𝑎0+#1 > 0, and island 2 is the leader when 𝑡 = 𝑠 + 2𝑘 + 1, that is, 𝑎0+#1+" < 0. 
[𝑖] When 𝑘 = 0, by our definition of 𝑠, 𝑎0 > 0 and 𝑎0+" < 0 are satisfied. 
 [𝑖𝑖] When 𝑘 = 𝑚 , assume that 𝑎0+#2 > 0 and 𝑎0+#2+" < 0 are satisfied. 
Then, when 𝑘 = 𝑚 + 1, 𝑎0+#(2+") and 𝑎0+#(2+")+" are given by equation (21) and 
equation (22), respectively, as follows: 
𝑎0+#(2+") = 𝛼#(1 − 𝛽)#𝑎0+#2 − 𝛼(1 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝛼 + 𝛼𝛽)ln(1 − 𝛽) > 0, (21) 
𝑎0+#(2+")+" = 𝛼#(1 − 𝛽)#𝑎0+#2+" + 𝛼(1 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝛼 + 𝛼𝛽)ln(1 − 𝛽) < 0. (22) 
Because we assumed that 𝑎0+#2 > 0 and 𝑎0+#2+" < 0, from equations (21) and (22), 
𝑎0+#(2+") > 0 and 𝑎0+#(2+")+" < 0 are also satisfied. From [𝑖] and [𝑖𝑖], island 1 
and island 2 will alternate as the leader after period s. ∎ 
 
 From Proposition 3, we obtain equations (23) and (24) as follows: 
𝑎0+#1+" = 𝛼(1 − 𝛽)𝑎0+#1 + 𝛼(1 − 𝛽)ln(1 − 𝛽), (23) 
𝑎0+#(1+") = −𝛼𝛽𝑎0+#1+" − 𝛼(1 − 𝛽)ln(1 − 𝛽). (24) 
 If we define 𝑎3∗  and 𝑎4∗  as steady-state conditions satisfying 𝑎3∗ =
𝑎0+#(1+") = 𝑎0+#1 and 𝑎4∗ = 𝑎0+#(1+")+" = 𝑎0+#1+", respectively, using equations (21) 
and (22), we obtain equations (25) and (26) as follows: 
𝑎3∗ = −𝛼(1 − 𝛽)(1 + 𝛼𝛽)1 + 𝛼#𝛽(1 − 𝛽) ln(1 − 𝛽), (25) 
𝑎4∗ = 𝛼(1 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝛼 + 𝛼𝛽)1 + 𝛼#𝛽(1 − 𝛽) ln(1 − 𝛽). (26) 
 
PROPOSITION 4: (Limit Cycle) After period 𝑠, the dynamics of human capital gap 
between island 1 and island 2 is a limit cycle. 
 
PROOF: Let ∆𝑎4,0+#1+" = |𝑎0+#1+" − 𝑎4∗ | and ∆𝑎3,0+#1 = |𝑎0+#1 − 𝑎3∗ |. Then, from 
equations (23), (24), (25), and (26), ∆𝑎4,0+#1+" can be expressed using ∆𝑎3,0+#1 and 
∆𝑎3,0+#(1+") can be expressed using ∆𝑎4,0+#1+" as follows: 
∆𝑎4,0+#1+" = 𝛼(1 − 𝛽)∆𝑎3,0+#1 , (27) 
∆𝑎3,0+#(1+") = −𝛼𝛽∆𝑎4,0+#1+". (28) 
Thus, it holds that ∆𝑎3,0+#(1+") < ∆𝑎4,0+#1+" < ∆𝑎3,0+#1. Therefore, after period 𝑠, the 
dynamics of human capital between island 1 and island 2 is a limit cycle.∎ 
 
 Figure 1 shows a phase diagram of the human capital gap between island 1 




The human capital gap between island 1 and island 2 
 
Finally, we obtain the human capital of island 1 and island 2 in the steady 
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1 is given by: 
𝑧",0+#(1+") = 𝛼#(1 − 𝛽 + 𝛽#)𝑧",0+#1 + 𝛼#𝛽(1 − 𝛽)𝑧#,0+#1 + 𝛼(1 + 𝛼)ln𝜃
− 𝛼(1 + 𝛼𝛽)(1 − 𝛽)ln(1 − 𝛽), 
(30) 
𝑧",0+#(1+")+" = 𝛼#(1 − 𝛽)𝑧",0+#1+" + 𝛼#𝛽𝑧#,0+#1+" + 𝛼(𝛼 + 1)ln𝜃
− 𝛼#(1 − 𝛽)ln(1 − 𝛽). 
(31) 
Let 𝑧",3∗  and 𝑧#,3∗  be the steady-state human capital of island 1 and island 2, 
respectively, in period 𝑠 + 2𝑘. Similarly, let 𝑧",4∗  and 𝑧#,4∗  be the steady-state human 
capital of island 1  and island 2 , respectively, in period 𝑠 + 2𝑘 + 1 . Since 𝑧#,3∗ =
𝑧",3∗ − 𝑎3∗  and 𝑧#,4∗ = 𝑧",4∗ − 𝑎4∗ , 𝑧",3∗ , 𝑧#,3∗ , 𝑧",4∗ , and 𝑧#,4∗  are given by equations (32), 
(33), (34), and (35), respectively, as follows: 
𝑧",3∗ = − 𝛼(1 + 𝛼𝛽)(1 − 𝛽)(1 + 𝛼)(1 − 𝛼)[1 + 𝛼#𝛽(1 − 𝛽)] ln(1 − 𝛽) + 𝛼1 − 𝛼 ln𝜃, (32) 
𝑧#,3∗ = − 𝛼5(1 + 𝛼𝛽)(1 − 𝛽)(1 + 𝛼)(1 − 𝛼)[1 + 𝛼#𝛽(1 − 𝛽)] ln(1 − 𝛽) + 𝛼1 − 𝛼 ln𝜃. (33) 
𝑧",4∗ = − 𝛼#(1 + 𝛼𝛽)(1 − 𝛽)(1 + 𝛼)(1 − 𝛼)[1 + 𝛼#𝛽(1 − 𝛽)] ln(1 − 𝛽) + 𝛼1 − 𝛼 ln𝜃, (34) 
𝑧#,4∗ = −𝛼[1 + 𝛼𝛽 − 𝛼#(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝛽)](1 − 𝛽)(1 + 𝛼)(1 − 𝛼)[1 + 𝛼#𝛽(1 − 𝛽)] ln(1 − 𝛽) + 𝛼1 − 𝛼 ln𝜃. (35) 
From equations (16), (32), (33), (34), and (35), 𝑧",3∗ > 𝑧",4∗ > 𝑧"%∗ and 𝑧#,4∗ > 𝑧#,3∗ > 𝑧#%∗ 
hold (see also Figure 2, Figure 3, and Figure 4). Summarizing the above, we obtain 
Proposition 5. 
 
PROPOSITION 5: (Voluntary Provision of Online Education) Developed countries have 
incentives to voluntarily supply online education to developing countries. 
 
 As shown in Proposition 5, a leader country will voluntarily provide online 
education to a follower country, despite the externality. Developed countries will invest 
in the human capital of developing countries by providing online education to them so 
that they will be able to receive higher-quality education in the future when their human 
capital exceeds that of the developed countries. Figure 2  and Figure 3  show the 
dynamics of human capital on each island. Figure 4 shows the results of a simulation 
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Human capital on island 1 and island 2 under a leapfrogging regime 
 
4. Conclusion 
In this study, we propose a model generalizing the human capital production 
function of Acemoglu et al. (2014). The results show that first, the lower the preschool 
human capital, the greater the benefit from the introduction of online education, and 
second, the lower the quality of teachers in developing countries, the greater the benefit 
from the introduction of online education only if the quality of teachers in developed 


































































-(z1,t(Closed) (̂1/2)) -(z1,t(Open)^(1/2)) -(z2,t (̂1/2))
We also provide a model of the impact of online education on long-term human 
capital growth. Developing countries are sure to leapfrog developed countries in terms of 
human capital in the long term because their human capital increases more rapidly than 
that of developed countries. Thereafter, the former developed countries and the former 
developing countries alternate as leaders in terms of human capital. Because the 
introduction of online education raises the level of human capital in both developed and 
developing countries, developed countries have an incentive to voluntarily provide online 
education to developing countries. 
In this study, we did not discuss changes in teachers’ wages, which are also likely 
to influence the number of teachers in an economy, so it may be worth changing the labor 
market to a two-sector model with a goods sector and an education sector. It would also 
be worthwhile introducing the supply cost of online education (considered in Li et al. 
(2016)) or the cost of Internet infrastructure development to the model and comparing the 
results with those obtained in this study. 
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